Djibouti

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

Djibouti's geography is its fortune. It sits by the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which separates the Gulf of Aden from the Red Sea and controls the approaches to the Suez Canal, near some of the world's busiest shipping lanes⁶. It is the principal port for landlocked Ethiopia, linked by an electrified railway to Addis Ababa since 2018⁶. The land itself is small, about 23,200 square kilometres, and offers little else⁶. A poor territory in a priceless place.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

Djibouti is small, with about 1.07 million people at the 2024 census, the smallest population in mainland Africa⁶. Its median age is about 25.2², and GDP per head is about US$4,556³, high for the region. But the modelled unemployment rate is 26%⁵, a sign that the port and bases employ few. Sourced data on schooling and skills was not gathered for this assessment. A small population that the port economy has not put to work.

What habits does the society reward?

Djibouti's institutions serve a narrow ruling group. Transparency International scored it 31 in 2025, ranking 124th of 182⁷. The government is dominated by the Issa clan⁶. Human rights groups accuse the authorities of repressing free speech and political activity, which the government rejects⁸. Elections are not contests: Guelleh won in 2005 with 100% in a one-man election⁶. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group. Orderly administration without accountability.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, president since 1999, has exploited Djibouti's position shrewdly. He has leased bases to the United States, France, Japan, Italy and China, built the Doraleh container terminal with DP World, and tied the port to Ethiopia by rail⁶. Growth reached 7.0% in 2024 and debt is forecast to fall from 40.3% of GDP in 2021 to 28.7% in 2026³. But he removed term limits in 2010 and age limits in 2025, and won a sixth term in April 2026 with 97.81%⁸. Good use of position, no plan for succession.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

Djibouti is stable. Its only war, the civil war with the FRUD rebels, lasted from 1991 to 2001 and ended in a power-sharing agreement⁶. Since then there has been no armed conflict. But the order is maintained by a government accused of repressing political activity, and the main opposition parties have boycotted elections since 2016⁸. Comparable crime data was not gathered for this assessment. Peaceful and controlled.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

Djibouti's two largest communities are Somalis and Afar⁶. A civil war in the 1990s over government representation ended in a power-sharing agreement in 2000⁶. Since then FRUD has backed the ruling party⁶. The government is dominated by the Somali Issa clan⁶, and the main opposition boycotts elections⁸. Survey data on trust was not gathered for this assessment. A settled but unequal bargain between communities.

Why does the world need this country?

Djibouti matters far beyond its size. It hosts military bases of the United States, France, Japan, Italy and China, which pay rent: US$63 million a year from the United States for Camp Lemonnier, about US$30 million each from France and Japan, and US$20 million from China⁶. It handles about 95% of Ethiopia's transit cargo and hosts IGAD's headquarters⁶. Its position on the Bab al-Mandeb strait makes it a key point on the route between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden⁸. A small state that great powers cannot ignore.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: steady rent from foreign bases, more than 5% of GDP in 2017⁶; continued Ethiopian transit trade through its port and railway⁶; and calm on the Bab-el-Mandeb shipping lanes⁶. Want: to keep all the great powers present so that none dominates⁶. Fear: an Ethiopia that finds another route to the sea; conflict spilling over from its neighbours; and a disputed succession after a president who has ruled since 1999⁸.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Djibouti balances great powers as well as any small state. The United States has leased Camp Lemonnier since 2002, renewed in 2014 for 20 years; France, Japan, Italy and China also keep bases there⁶. Each pays rent, and none dominates⁶. Its main economic partner is Ethiopia, for which it is the principal port⁶. Its weakness is that this balance depends on outsiders' rivalries continuing. A small state that has made itself useful to everyone.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Djibouti has little military power of its own. SIPRI's last figure for its military spending is 2.63% of GDP in 2008⁴; nothing recent is published. Its armed forces' only war was the civil war of 1991 to 2001, in which France supported the government⁶. Its real security comes from the foreign bases on its soil⁶, which no neighbour would risk confronting. Protected by its tenants, not by its army.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Djibouti is doing steadily well. The IMF records growth of 6.8% in 2023, 7.0% in 2024 and 4.9% in 2025, with 5.6% forecast for 2026, low inflation and debt falling from 40.3% of GDP in 2021 to a forecast 28.7% in 2026³. But a modelled unemployment rate of 26%⁵ shows the gains are narrow, and the 78-year-old president's extended rule⁸ leaves the future uncertain. Steady growth, unshared.