Libya

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

Libya's map is rich but hard to hold. It controls the largest proven oil reserves in Africa⁴ and a long Mediterranean coastline facing Europe, with a small population of about 7.5 million¹. Most of the country is desert, and its southern borders with unstable neighbours are hard to police. Its gas could in principle supply Europe, but a study of Europe's suppliers judged it a broken state whose plans to develop gas fields face major obstacles¹⁰. Valuable ground, poorly governed.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

Libya's population of about 7.5 million is young, with a median age near 28^1,2. Too many lack productive work: the modelled unemployment rate is about 18.8%⁸, and the economy depends on oil and gas for about 95% of exports and government revenue⁴, a sector that employs few people. Reliable data on education and skills was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence. A small, young population living off oil rents.

What habits does the society reward?

The habits behind clean, predictable government are almost absent. Libya scored 13 on Transparency International's 2025 index, unchanged, ranking 177th of 182 countries⁷. Continuum Economics rates legal and regulatory risk as very high⁴. With oil and gas providing about 95% of exports and revenue⁴, the state rewards control of rents more than enterprise. Data on work norms and social trust is thin, hence low confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Libya has no single leadership to judge. Since 2014 it has been divided between the internationally recognised government in Tripoli and an eastern administration backed by Khalifa Haftar⁶. In August 2026 the rival camps signed a UN-backed deal to hold legislative and presidential elections under a single executive within 24 months⁶, but deeds, not signatures, will decide whether it means anything. The one visible success is in oil, where output reached a 13-year high^5,11. Divided authority, little delivery.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

Order in Libya is fragmented. Two administrations compete for legitimacy and for control of territory and oil revenue^4,6, and Continuum Economics rates political interference and political violence as very high⁴. Corruption is among the worst in the world, with a score of 13⁷. There is no unified army or police. The state does not hold a monopoly on force. A critical weakness.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

Libya has been split between east and west since 2014⁶, and the tense relationship between the two halves keeps the risk of doing business very high⁴. The August 2026 election deal is a step toward reunification, with Haftar's delegation committing to work with the UN on implementing it⁶. Until the two administrations actually merge, cohesion remains the country's deepest weakness. Reliable survey data on trust is limited, hence low confidence.

Why does the world need this country?

Libya matters mainly as an oil producer and as a transit country on the Mediterranean. Its crude output reached 1,438,560 barrels a day in 2026, a 13-year high^5,11. It targets 2 million barrels a day by 2030¹¹. The IMF puts its 2026 GDP at about US$57 billion³. Its gas potential is held back by its divisions¹⁰. A supplier others need, not a power others follow.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: steady oil output and exports, which provide about 95% of exports and government revenue⁴; and a single government able to manage that wealth⁶. Want: elections within 24 months, as the August 2026 deal promises⁶; a rise in oil capacity to 2 million barrels a day¹¹; and foreign investment in its gas. Fear: a collapse of the election deal and renewed fighting between east and west; disruption to oil fields and ports; and further fragmentation of state institutions⁴.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Libya is an object of other powers' rivalry more than an actor in its own right. The UN-led process, supported by the Security Council, is the main framework for its politics⁶. Each of its two administrations has its own foreign backers, which gives outsiders influence over its future. Detailed, sourced data on those alignments was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence. Weak and penetrated.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Libya has no unified armed forces: each administration controls its own forces, and armed groups operate alongside them^4,6. SIPRI's latest estimate puts military spending at 3.57% of GDP in 2023⁹, with no figure since. Continuum Economics rates political violence as very high⁴, a measure of how far force remains outside state control. Readiness data is very limited, hence low confidence. Fragmented force, not national strength.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Libya is improving from a very low base. The IMF records growth of 4.2% in 2024 and 15.9% in 2025, and forecasts 3.3% for 2026³, driven by oil. Crude output reached a 13-year high^5,11, and the rival camps have signed a deal to hold elections within 24 months⁶. Against this, oil and gas still provide about 95% of revenue⁴, and the country remains divided. Better than it was, with the hard part still ahead.