Mozambique

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

Mozambique's map is better than its fortunes. It has a long Indian Ocean coast, and its railways link the port of Beira to the landlocked countries of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe¹⁷, which makes it a gateway for its region. Offshore, the Rovuma Basin holds recoverable gas reserves estimated at 4,200 billion cubic metres¹⁶, among the larger finds of recent decades. The same northern province, Cabo Delgado, is the home of an Islamist insurgency that has displaced 1.5 million people¹². A strong endowment, much of it in the country's least secure corner.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

Mozambique has about 36.6 million people with a median age of 16.6, one of the youngest populations in the world^1,2. It remains one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world¹⁷, with GDP per head of about US$673³. The modelled unemployment rate is 6.6%⁵, but most work is informal and the figure says little about productive jobs. Reliable data on schooling and skills was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence. A very young population that the economy is not yet equipping or employing.

What habits does the society reward?

The habits behind clean government are weak and getting weaker. Mozambique scored 21 on Transparency International's 2025 index, down 4 points, ranking 161st of 182¹⁰. In 2016 it emerged that loans of over two billion dollars had been taken on secretly and subjected to large-scale embezzlement, and donors suspended budget support¹⁵. Data on social trust and work norms is limited, hence low confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, Frelimo's leadership has failed the basic test of stewardship. The secret loans revealed in 2016¹⁵ cost the country its credit, and the IMF now judges the debt unsustainable, with arrears estimated at 1.3% of GDP⁷. The state needed Rwandan soldiers to secure the LNG site in its own territory⁹. President Daniel Chapo, inaugurated on 15 January 2025 after a disputed election¹¹, has restarted the US$20 billion LNG project⁹ and is seeking an IMF programme by the end of 2026⁸. These are steps; results are yet to come.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

Mozambique does not fully control its territory. The Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado has killed 6,570 people, including 2,759 civilians, and displaced 1.5 million¹². Security around the LNG site improved only with the deployment of Rwandan soldiers, and the insurgency, though weakened, continues to simmer⁹. Protests after the disputed 2024 election caused over 300 deaths¹¹. Corruption is severe, with a score of 21¹⁰. Order is held in the capital and contested at the edges.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

Mozambique's cohesion is strained on two fronts. In the north, the insurgency has displaced 1.5 million people¹². In the cities, the 2024 election broke the habit of accepting Frelimo's results: Venâncio Mondlane disputed Daniel Chapo's declared victory, and protests caused over 300 deaths¹¹. The memory of a civil war that caused about one million deaths before peace in 1992¹⁴ restrains both sides. Survey data on trust is limited, hence low confidence.

Why does the world need this country?

Mozambique is a small economy, about US$24.8 billion in 2026³, and its relevance rests on gas. The Rovuma Basin's reserves¹⁶ and the US$20 billion TotalEnergies project restarted in January 2026, which aims for first gas by 2029⁹, could make it a significant LNG supplier. Its ports matter to its landlocked neighbours¹⁷. Until the gas flows, its weight is regional.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: an IMF programme, which the government hopes to conclude by the end of 2026⁸, and a way to manage a debt the IMF judges unsustainable⁷; security in Cabo Delgado, where it relies on Rwandan troops⁹. Want: first LNG production by 2029⁹; investors' confidence back after the hidden-debt scandal¹⁵. Fear: a disorderly default, since Fitch expects any IMF deal to require a distressed exchange of its Eurobond⁶; the insurgency spreading¹²; and renewed unrest after the disputed 2024 election¹¹.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Mozambique depends on others for its security and its finances. Rwandan soldiers guard the LNG site⁹; the IMF, whose programme it is negotiating, holds the key to its debt^7,8; and TotalEnergies' decision to restart the LNG project⁹ shapes its economic future. It has few levers of its own beyond the gas and the ports^16,17. Detailed, sourced data on its great-power ties was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Mozambique's armed forces could not defeat the Cabo Delgado insurgency on their own. Rwandan troops were deployed to the province in 2021¹², and security around the LNG site improved only with that special deployment⁹. SIPRI puts military spending at 1.87% of GDP in 2025⁴, on an economy of about US$24.8 billion³. The insurgency, though weakened, continues⁹. A state that rents its security from a neighbour.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Mozambique is going backwards. The IMF records growth of 5.5% in 2023, 2.2% in 2024 and -0.2% in 2025, with 1.0% forecast for 2026³. Government debt is about 91% of GDP in 2026 and forecast to rise to 98.6% in 2027³; the IMF reclassified it as unsustainable⁷, and Fitch rates the country CC⁶. The restart of the LNG project in January 2026⁹ is the one large positive, but first gas is not expected before 2029. Down now, with a possible turn later.