Oman

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

Oman's map is its main asset. It sits at the mouth of the Gulf on the south-east corner of Arabia⁸, and unlike its neighbours its exports do not depend on the Strait of Hormuz: oil leaves through Duqm, Mina Al Fahal and Salalah¹⁰. In the 2026 war its ports kept the rest of the Gulf supplied with essential goods⁹. The position cuts both ways: Iranian attacks hit Sohar, Duqm and Salalah, and fuel tanks in Salalah were set ablaze in March⁹. Its resources are thinner than its neighbours': as of 2025 it had about 13.6 years of oil reserves and 14.5 of gas, produced at high cost⁹. A valuable location on top of a costly, dwindling store of oil.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

The population is about 5.4 million, of whom 56.75% are Omani citizens and 43.25% expatriates¹³, with a median age of about 30². The state has invested in its people: Qaboos's modernisation brought increased spending on health, education and welfare⁸. The harder task is work for Omanis. In 2011 protesters demanded jobs and political reform, and the sultan answered by promising jobs and benefits⁸. The ILO's modelled unemployment rate of 3.3%⁵ covers citizens and expatriates together and says little about young Omanis. Comparable recent data on skills and on citizen unemployment was not found, hence low confidence. A capable but small national workforce, still reliant on foreign labour.

What habits does the society reward?

The institutional habits are sound by regional standards, though slipping. Oman scored 52 on Transparency International's 2025 index, down three points, ranking 54th of 182⁷. It has a long state tradition: it is the oldest independent state in the Arab world, and the Al Bu Said dynasty has ruled since 1749⁸. Political rights have come by decree rather than contest: Qaboos let women vote and stand for the Consultative Council in 1997 and extended the vote to all citizens over 21 in 2002⁸. Survey data on trust, rule-following and work norms was not gathered, hence low confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, Sultan Haitham has done what he set out to do with the public finances. He succeeded his cousin Qaboos in January 2020 and leads the Vision 2040 effort to make the country less reliant on oil and gas revenue⁸. Spending restraint cut central government debt to 34.7% of GDP by the end of 2025¹¹, and Moody's raised it to investment grade in 2025, citing the significant reduction in the debt burden¹⁴. Oman will be the first Gulf state to tax personal income, from 2028¹⁶. In the war it kept its neutral course⁹. But its mediation could not prevent the US-Israeli strikes on Iran¹⁷, and in May Trump publicly threatened it⁹. A disciplined steward, with less sway abroad than at home.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

Oman is orderly. Its last armed challenge, the Dhofar Rebellion of 1965–75, was put down with British, Jordanian, Emirati and Iranian backing⁸. The 2011 protests for jobs and reform were a rare outbreak of dissent, and one demonstrator was shot dead by police⁸. In 2020 Haitham succeeded Qaboos, who had ruled since 1970⁸. Corruption is moderate and slightly worse: a score of 52, down three points⁷. The war has tested the state: Iranian attacks hit three of its ports⁹, yet the IMF found the economic damage limited to inflation and some non-oil sectors¹¹. Firm order, resting on the ruler's authority rather than on contested institutions.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

Oman has overcome deep divisions before. From 1913 the interior was ruled by Ibadi imams and the coast by the sultan, and the sultan regained the interior in 1959 only with the help of the British army and an RAF bombing campaign⁸. The Dhofar rebellion in the south lasted from 1965 to 1975⁸. No comparable split has opened since. The risks today are economic: expatriates make up 43.25% of residents¹³, and the 2011 protests showed how the demand for jobs can become political⁸. Data on trust and social cohesion was not gathered, hence low confidence. A nation joined from rival halves, now held together by the state and its spending.

Why does the world need this country?

The world needs Oman more since the war began. Its economy is modest, at about US$121bn in 2026³, and its oil reserves are short-lived⁹. But it is one of the two coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz, and in June 2026 it agreed with Iran to form a joint working group on the future management of navigation in the strait, its services and associated costs¹². Its ports have kept Gulf trade moving, and tankers shuttling Gulf crude have used Sohar⁹. Before the war it was the channel between Washington and Tehran, mediating their indirect nuclear talks¹⁷. These roles raise Muscat's geopolitical salience⁹. Small, but placed where much of the world's oil must pass.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: oil and gas revenue while it lasts, about 13.6 years of oil reserves as of 2025⁹, and safe shipping in the Gulf of Oman, where Iran has widened its attacks¹⁸. Need: jobs for Omanis and non-oil revenue, including a 5% income tax on high earners from 2028¹⁶. Want: an end to the war, which it pressed for in welcoming the April ceasefire¹⁵, and a say in how Hormuz is run through its working group with Iran¹². Want: investment in Sohar and Duqm as routes around the strait⁹. Fear: Iranian strikes on its ports and oil output, which S&P says could trigger a downgrade^9,10; American anger at its neutrality; and a Hormuz toll plan that would set it against its Gulf neighbours⁹.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Oman balances where others choose sides. It has traditionally pursued a neutral course while being broadly pro-Western⁹. It was a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981⁸, yet in June 2026 it stood with Iran as the two coastal states of the strait, affirming their sovereign rights over their territorial waters in Hormuz and setting up a joint working group¹². It mediated the US-Iran talks until the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, and welcomed the April ceasefire brokered by Pakistan^17,15. The balance has costs: in May Trump warned that Oman would behave like everybody else or be blown up, and an Iranian toll plan shared with Muscat would anger its Gulf neighbours⁹. A skilled hedger, now under pressure from both camps.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Oman spends heavily but cannot defend itself alone. SIPRI puts military spending at 5.68% of GDP in 2025⁴, on an economy of about US$121bn³. In its real wars it has needed outside help: the interior was regained in 1959 with the British army and an RAF bombing campaign, and the Dhofar rebellion was put down with British, Jordanian, Emirati and Iranian backing⁸. In 2026 it could not stop Iranian attacks on its ports, and it will have to spend more on hardening facilities against drones and missiles⁹. Readiness data was not gathered, hence low confidence. Well funded, but secure only through its diplomacy and its friends.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Oman is rising slowly. Growth picked up to 2.4% in 2025 from 1.6% in 2024, and the IMF expects about 3.7% in 2026 as oil production rises¹¹. The fiscal surplus, 0.6% of GDP in 2025, is projected at 4.5% in 2026, and central government debt, 34.7% of GDP at the end of 2025, is still falling¹¹; S&P projects 30.2% by the end of 2026⁶. S&P and Moody's both rate it investment grade^6,14. But much of the gain is the war's oil price: the budget assumed $60 a barrel against $81 in the first half⁹. Non-oil growth is slowing to 2.5% as tourism and construction suffer¹¹, and reserves are short⁹. Rising, on foundations that still rest on oil.