Russia

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

Russia's map gives it strategic depth and a treasure house of commodities. It is the world's leading producer of mined palladium, at an estimated 84,000 kilograms in 2025¹⁸, and one of the largest exporters of oil and gas. When the Iran war closed most of the Strait of Hormuz, Russia's oil export revenue jumped 94% in a month¹³. The limits are climate and distance: most of the land is cold and thinly settled, its ports are frozen or bottled up behind straits others control, and its long borders are hard to defend. A rich inheritance that rewards extraction more than development.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

The population is educated but shrinking. Births fell to 1.222 million in 2024, the lowest since 1999, and fell another 3% in early 2025; in some regions two or three people die for every one born⁹. The median age is about 41⁴. The war has made the shortage acute: unemployment was just 2.2% in June 2026, and the authorities project a shortfall of about 3.1 million workers by 2030, citing mobilisation and emigration⁶. War losses and emigration are not reliably counted, which keeps confidence at medium. The human base on which LKY placed most weight is eroding.

What habits does the society reward?

The habits pull in different directions. Russia has a deep tradition of science, engineering and endurance under hardship, and a highly educated workforce. Against that, violence is high for a country of its income: the homicide rate was about 6.8 per 100,000 people in 2021¹⁴. Trust in institutions is low and corruption is expected in dealings with the state¹. Independent survey data is scarce under wartime censorship, hence low confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

On deeds, the Kremlin has shown skill at survival and poor strategic judgement. The economy did not collapse under sanctions, and growth returned to 1.3% in the second quarter of 2026¹⁵. But the war it chose has cost it Europe as a market and partner, and the budget now bends around it: the 2026 deficit estimate doubled to 3.2% of GDP and planned defence spending for 2027 rose 27%⁵. US-brokered talks in September produced no breakthrough¹². The 2026 election gave the ruling party more than three-fourths of the Duma seats, with genuine opposition excluded¹¹. Firm control, at the expense of strategy.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

The state is strong at control and weak at law. Russia scored 22 on Transparency International's 2025 index, unchanged, ranking 157th of 182¹. On the World Justice Project's 2025 index it ranked 119th with a score of 0.41¹⁷. Courts serve the state rather than check it, and the 2026 election was tightly orchestrated, with genuine opposition excluded¹¹. Violent crime is high, at about 6.8 homicides per 100,000 people¹⁴. The streets are policed and dissent is suppressed, but property and contracts are not safe from the state. LKY weighted clean, predictable government most; Russia offers neither.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

There is no visible mass opposition, and the war has not broken the system: the ruling party won a record share of seats in September 2026¹¹. But cohesion is enforced more than chosen. Genuine opposition parties and candidates were barred from the vote¹¹, and in some regions deaths already run at two or three times births⁹. The annexed Ukrainian regions add a contested population that Moscow counts as its own and the UN does not¹⁰. Stable under pressure, but the stability is held in place by the state and could prove brittle if the war goes badly.

Why does the world need this country?

Russia matters because of what it can supply and what it can destroy. With the United States it holds about 86% of the world's nuclear weapons¹⁹. It is the leading palladium producer¹⁸ and a major oil supplier, which the Iran war made more valuable: oil export revenue jumped 94% in the first month of that war¹³. Its GDP of about US$2.9 trillion is modest for its size³, and its trade has shifted heavily toward China, which bought US$73.6 billion of Russian goods in the first half of 2026¹⁶. A permanent seat on the UN Security Council keeps it at the table.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: oil and gas revenue to fund the state and the war, which sanctions and price swings keep squeezing; the 2026 deficit estimate has already doubled⁵. It also needs workers⁶. Want: a settlement in Ukraine on its terms, including recognition of the regions it claims, which Ukraine and most states reject¹⁰; sanctions relief; and a sphere of influence on its borders. Fear: a long war that drains the economy, deeper dependence on China¹⁶, Western weapons tipping the front, and unrest if living standards fall.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Russia has lost room to manoeuvre. Europe has cut it off, and it leans on China, where trade rose 25.6% to US$134.2 billion in the first half of 2026¹⁶. That is partnership with a much larger power, on terms Beijing increasingly sets. It has exploited the US distraction with Iran, and US envoys spent three hours with Putin in September without a breakthrough¹². Its main windfall came from someone else's war, as Hormuz closures lifted its oil earnings¹³. A great power by arsenal, but without the diplomatic freedom it had before 2022.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Russia's military is large, combat-hardened and backed by the world's largest nuclear arsenal, shared at the top only with the United States¹⁹. It plans to spend 17.1 trillion roubles, about US$203 billion, on defence in 2027, the most since the invasion began, and the true figure is classified⁵. US officials worry the war is on the verge of escalating further¹². Yet more than four years of fighting have not delivered the victory it sought, and its losses are not reliably counted. Formidable and dangerous, but not able to impose its will cheaply.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Russia is running down. The IMF expects growth of 0.9% in 2026 and 2027³. Output grew 1.3% in the second quarter after a first-quarter drop of 0.2%, driven by consumer spending rather than investment¹⁵. The 2026 budget deficit estimate doubled to 3.2% of GDP, borrowing is rising, and defence takes a growing share of spending⁵. Births keep falling⁹. The oil windfall from the Iran war was temporary relief, not a new engine¹³. A war economy that is borrowing against its future.