Togo

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

Togo's map is narrow but well placed. It sits on the West African coast between Ghana and Benin, with Burkina Faso to the north⁶. Its deepwater port at Lomé handled an expected 30 million tonnes in 2024, up from 14 million in 2016, nearly 70% of it transshipment, making Togo a regional logistics hub⁹. Regional corridors and an emerging airport hub add to its assets⁶. The north is the weak side: security challenges from the Sahel crisis affect communities in the Savanes region⁶. A small country that earns its living from its position.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

The population is about 8.8 million, with a median age of about 18^1,2. Human capital is weak: Togo's Human Capital Index is 0.43, so a child born today will be only 43% as productive as possible⁶. The working-age population grows by about 150,000 a year while the economy creates about 90,000 jobs, so around 60% of the working-age population is underemployed and only 10% of young people find formal paid work before 25⁶. Rural poverty is 58.2% against 26.2% in towns⁶. The ILO's modelled unemployment rate of 2%⁵ hides this. A young workforce growing faster than its jobs.

What habits does the society reward?

The institutional habits are weak. Togo scored 32 on Transparency International's 2025 index, unchanged, ranking 120th of 182⁷. Power has been held by one family for nearly six decades: Gnassingbé Eyadéma seized power in 1967, and on his death in 2005 the military installed his son Faure, whose election wins the opposition has denounced as fraudulent⁸. In 2025 RFI and France 24 were suspended for three months, and the government imposed severe internet restrictions during protests¹¹. Survey data on trust and work norms was not gathered, hence low confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, Faure Gnassingbé's government is competent on the economy and unyielding on power. Growth reached 6.5% in 2024 and an estimated 6.3% in 2025⁶, and the deficit shrank from 6.7% of GDP in 2023 to 4.6% in 2024, earning an S&P upgrade⁹. The port and industrial zone have drawn investors⁹. But in 2024 a new constitution moved Togo to a parliamentary system, and in May 2025 Gnassingbé became President of the Council of Ministers, a powerful new post that lets him remain in power indefinitely^11,6. Protests were met with lethal force¹¹. Effective management in the service of permanent rule.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

Order holds in most of the country. The state is stable and its ruling party, UNIR, dominates politics⁶. But in the north, the Sahel crisis affects communities in the Savanes region, and the government has extended a state of emergency through March 2027⁶. In June 2025 protests in Lomé against Gnassingbé's continued rule were met with arbitrary arrests and lethal force, killing at least seven people^11,10. Amnesty International urged an inquiry into allegations of torture of protesters¹⁰. Corruption perceptions are weak, at 32⁷. A firm state with a troubled north and little tolerance of protest.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

Togo's divisions are mainly political. The opposition has contested the Gnassingbé family's rule for decades: in 1993 the dissolution of government sparked fatal clashes and thousands fled⁸, and protesters in 2017 carried banners saying fifty years was enough¹¹. In 2025, civil society activists and bloggers led protests against the constitutional change and the cost of living¹⁰. Displacement in the north, affecting about 433,758 people across three regions, strains host communities⁶. Survey data on social trust was not gathered, hence low confidence. A society that has not broken apart, but whose politics remain unsettled.

Why does the world need this country?

The world needs Togo mainly for its port. The IMF puts its 2026 GDP at about US$13.1bn³. Lomé's port is a transshipment hub for the region, with nearly 70% of its traffic transshipment⁹, and an industrial hub at Adétikopé processes cotton and soybeans⁹. Its north is a buffer against the spread of the Sahel insurgency towards the coast⁶. It has courted new partners, joining the Commonwealth in 2022⁸. A useful hub, but not a power.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: trade through Lomé's port and the regional corridors^6,9; and jobs for the 150,000 people who join the working-age population each year⁶. Want: growth near 6% a year and a deficit down to 3% of GDP by 2027⁹; and investment in agriculture, energy and logistics under its 2026–2031 roadmap⁶. Want, for the ruling family: continued power under the new constitution¹¹. Fear: the Sahel's insurgency spreading in the north, which S&P warns could strain the budget^9,6; renewed protests¹⁰; and Middle East shocks to energy and food prices⁶.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Togo has little weight of its own and works with whoever offers investment. The World Bank Group has a US$2.1bn portfolio there⁶. It joined the Commonwealth in 2022, alongside Gabon, broadening its partners beyond France⁸. Relations with French media soured in 2025 when RFI and France 24 were suspended¹¹. Its northern neighbour, Burkina Faso, is the source of the insurgency it faces^9,6. Data on its security partnerships was not gathered, hence low confidence. A small coastal state that hedges quietly.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Togo's forces are small and stretched by the north. SIPRI puts military spending at 1.87% of GDP in 2025⁴, on an economy of about US$13bn³. The army has a long political role: it killed the first president in a 1963 coup, and installed Faure Gnassingbé in 2005⁸. It faces the Sahel's insurgency in the Savanes region, where a state of emergency runs to March 2027⁶. Readiness data was not gathered, hence low confidence. Able to keep order at home, but not to end the threat from the north alone.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Togo is growing steadily but not transforming. Growth has averaged about 5.4% for 15 years, and reached 6.3% in 2025⁶. The World Bank expects 5.2% in 2026 because of the Middle East war, rising to 6.2% by 2028⁶. Public debt is expected to fall from nearly 60% of GDP to about 52% by 2028⁹. But job creation lags population growth, and underemployment is around 60%⁶. Politically the system has narrowed rather than opened¹¹. Steady progress that has not yet reached most young Togolese.