Burkina Faso

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

Burkina Faso's map is hard. It is a landlocked Sahel country of about 24.6 million people¹, far from the sea. Its main asset is gold: output rose to 90.8 tonnes in 2025 from 58.2 tonnes in 2022⁶. Its open borders with Mali and Niger, its partners in the Alliance of Sahel States¹⁴, are also the routes of an insurgency that now besieges localities in the Centre-Nord, Est, North and Sahel regions⁸. A poor location with one rich resource.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

Burkina Faso's population is very young, with a median age of about 18², and poor, with GDP per head of about US$1,316³. The modelled unemployment rate is 3.5%⁵, but most work is on farms or informal. The conflict has displaced many people, and at the end of 2024 sieges affected up to two million⁸. Reliable data on schooling and skills was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence.

What habits does the society reward?

The habits behind clean government are better than in many of its neighbours. Burkina Faso scored 40 on Transparency International's 2025 index, down 1 point, ranking 84th of 182 countries⁷. Its civic tradition is real: in 2014 mass protests forced out a president who tried to change the constitution to extend his 27 years in office¹². Data on social trust and work norms is limited, hence low confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, the junta of Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who took over on 30 September 2022¹³, has a narrow record. The budget deficit fell from 10.9% of GDP in 2022 to 1.5% in 2025, and growth reached 5.3%³; gold output rose⁶. But the core promise, security, has not been kept: insurgents continue to besiege towns and villages⁸. The junta has extended its rule by five years and used emergency powers to conscript critics⁸. Control of the capital, not of the country.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

Order has collapsed across much of the country. At the end of 2024 an estimated 40 localities were under siege, affecting up to two million people⁸, and terrorists have killed about 2,000 civilians a year in recent years, 87% more than in the preceding three years by one estimate⁹. Human Rights Watch reports grave abuses by both insurgents and the army and its civilian auxiliaries, including killings of civilians⁸. Reliable independent data is scarce. The state does not control large parts of its territory.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

The war is tearing at Burkina Faso's social fabric. Insurgents besiege communities, and Human Rights Watch reports that the army and its civilian auxiliaries have killed and forcibly displaced civilians⁸, which deepens grievances among the communities affected. The junta has silenced critics through conscription⁸. It has also broken with France and ECOWAS¹⁴. Survey data on trust and on support for the junta was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence.

Why does the world need this country?

Burkina Faso is a small economy, about US$32.4 billion in 2026³. Its relevance comes from gold, with output of 90.8 tonnes in 2025⁶, and from its place at the centre of the Sahel's jihadist war⁹ and of the Alliance of Sahel States, whose members left ECOWAS in 2025¹⁴. It matters to its coastal neighbours mostly as a source of insecurity.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: control of its own territory, with some 40 localities besieged at the end of 2024⁸; gold revenue, which rose with output⁶; and fiscal room to fight, with defence spending of 3.3% of GDP⁴. Want: sovereignty as it defines it, having ended its military agreement with France in January 2023 and left ECOWAS in 2025¹⁴; and solidarity with Mali and Niger in the Alliance of Sahel States¹⁴. Fear: the insurgency reaching the capital; another coup within the army¹³; and isolation from lenders, with a rating of CCC+⁶.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Burkina Faso has cut its old ties without finding strong new ones. In January 2023 the military government ended its military agreement with France and demanded the withdrawal of 400 French special forces within a month, and in 2025 it left ECOWAS with Mali and Niger to form the Alliance of Sahel States¹⁴. That isolates it from its coastal neighbours and Western partners. Detailed, sourced data on its ties with Russia and other new partners was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Burkina Faso's army is fighting a war it is not winning. SIPRI puts military spending at 3.3% of GDP in 2025⁴, high for its income. Yet insurgents besieged some 40 localities at the end of 2024⁸, and the army relies on civilian auxiliaries whom Human Rights Watch accuses, with the army, of grave abuses⁸. The force has also been a source of instability, removing a leader by coup as recently as 30 September 2022¹³. Committed, but overstretched.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Burkina Faso's economy is holding up better than its security. The IMF records growth of 4.8% in 2024 and 5.3% in 2025, with 4.4% forecast for 2026, and debt easing from 57.2% of GDP in 2024 to a forecast 51.0% in 2026³. S&P affirmed its CCC+ rating with a stable outlook in May 2026⁶. But the security situation is deteriorating⁹, and no economy can grow far while the state does not control its land.