Sudan

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

Sudan's geography is rich but hard to hold. It covers 1,886,068 square kilometres, Africa's third-largest country, and borders seven states plus the Red Sea⁶. It has gold, petroleum and many other minerals; gold output was 82 tonnes in 2015⁶. Landlocked South Sudan exports its oil by pipeline to Port Sudan⁶, which gives Khartoum leverage. But the land is vast and its peripheries, from Darfur to South Kordofan and Blue Nile, have repeatedly fought the centre⁶. A large endowment that has never been governed as one.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

Sudan's people are young, with a median age of about 18.8², and poor, with GDP per head of about US$597³. It ranked 170th on the Human Development Index in 2024⁶. The war has wrecked what capacity there was: by April 2025 famine had severely affected nearly 25 million people⁶, and nearly 15 million have been displaced or forced to flee⁸. More than 14 million refugees and displaced people make it the world's largest displacement crisis⁹. A generation is losing its homes and livelihoods.

What habits does the society reward?

The habits that make institutions work are weak. Transparency International scored Sudan 14 in 2025, down one point, ranking 175th of 182⁷. Power has passed by coup, not by rule: a military dictatorship ruled from 1989 to 2019, and the army removed the civilian government in October 2021⁶. Both the army and the RSF are accused of war crimes⁶. Sharia law, applied from 1983, was ended in 2020 when the state became secular⁶. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group. Rule by force has displaced rule by law.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, Sudan's leaders have failed. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led the October 2021 coup that deposed the civilian government⁶, then fell out with his deputy, Hemedti, head of the RSF, which was formed from the Janjaweed militia; the war began on 15 April 2023⁶. The army has had successes, expelling the RSF from Khartoum in March 2025⁹, but it lost El Fasher in October 2025⁶. The RSF set up a rival government in April 2025⁶. Leaders who let a militia grow into a rival army.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

There is no order in Sudan. The civil war between the army and the RSF has run since April 2023⁶, and aid workers estimate more than 200,000 people killed⁸. Widespread killings and rapes were reported after the RSF captured El Fasher in October 2025⁶, and a UN mission said the assault bore the hallmarks of genocide⁹. In mid-2026 the RSF besieged el-Obeid, trapping half a million people⁹, and in August it entered Kurmuk on the Ethiopian border as the army withdrew⁸. The state does not hold a monopoly of force.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

Sudan has been divided for most of its independent life. Civil wars in the south led to South Sudan's independence in 2011⁶, and the regime killed an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 people in Darfur and elsewhere⁶. Now a rival Government of Peace and Unity, set up in April 2025, administers areas held by the RSF and its allies⁶, so two authorities claim the state. Survey data on trust is unavailable. A country at risk of a second partition.

Why does the world need this country?

Sudan matters for its size, its position and the scale of its suffering. Its Red Sea coast, its Nile waters and its borders with seven states⁶ make its war a regional problem that draws in Gulf powers⁶. It is the world's largest displacement crisis⁹. But its economy, about US$30.9 billion³, is small for its population, and war has cut its weight. Relevant as a crisis, not as a power.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: an end to the war on terms that leave one authority in control, and food for the nearly 25 million affected by famine⁶. The army-led government needs to hold el-Obeid, the gateway between Darfur and central Sudan⁹, and its oil and gold revenues⁶. Want: outside patrons who will arm it and not the RSF; it accuses the UAE of supplying the RSF, which the UAE categorically rejects^6,10. Fear: partition along the front line, as the RSF's rival government entrenches⁶; and further losses in Kordofan and Blue Nile⁸.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Sudan's war is fought with outside help on both sides, and the claims are contested. A Sudanese general said the UAE was supplying the RSF⁶; the UAE categorically rejects providing weapons or support to the RSF and says it is not a party to the conflict¹⁰. Saudi Arabia and the UAE invested significant sums in the military council after al-Bashir's fall⁶. China owns 40% of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company and is a major trading partner⁶. Russia's Wagner Group has operated in Sudan since 2017⁶. A battleground for others' interests rather than a player.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Sudan's military is large but cannot win its war. SIPRI's latest figure puts military spending at 0.93% of GDP in 2021⁴, before the war. The army retook Khartoum in March 2025⁹ and holds its 5th Infantry Division and airbase at el-Obeid⁹, but in August 2026 the RSF attacked one town with more than 250 combat vehicles and struck five army-held cities with drones in a single day⁸. The RSF itself grew out of the Janjaweed militia⁶. Two armed forces, neither able to defeat the other.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Sudan is falling. The IMF records the economy shrinking by 23.5% in 2023 and 19.3% in 2024, with no growth in 2025; it forecasts 7.0% growth in 2026, but debt is put at 334.4% of GDP in 2026 and inflation at 41.3%³. Forecast growth is not yet a result. The war continues: in mid-2026 the RSF besieged el-Obeid⁹ and in August took Kurmuk⁸. Any recovery depends on peace that has not come.