Tunisia

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

Tunisia is a small country of about 12.4 million people¹ on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa, across the sea from southern Europe. Its prosperity depends on trade, tourism and the skills of its people. Its position made it a target for colonisers: France made it a protectorate by the Treaty of Bardo in 1881¹². Detailed sourced data on its resources and water was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence. A useful location without a resource cushion.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

Tunisia's people are its best asset and its biggest waste. Its income per head and human development indicators are above those of comparable countries⁶, and the median age is about 33². But the economy does not use them: unemployment was 14.9% in the second quarter of 2026, 35.4% among those aged 15 to 24, and 26.6% among university graduates, up from 24.2% a quarter earlier⁵. An educated workforce with too few jobs to go to.

What habits does the society reward?

The habits behind clean, predictable government are middling. Tunisia scored 39 on Transparency International's 2025 index, unchanged, ranking 91st of 182 countries⁷. It built the Arab world's most successful democratic transition after 2011, for which its National Dialogue Quartet won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize¹⁵, but much of that has since been undone⁹. Data on social trust and work norms is limited, hence low confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, President Kais Saied has gathered power but not delivered. On 25 July 2021 he dismissed the government and suspended parliament⁹, and a new constitution followed in 2022 on 30.5% turnout⁹. He was re-elected in October 2024 with 90.69% of the vote on 28.8% turnout, after one rival was jailed and others were rejected⁸. The economic record is poor: growth of 0.3% to 2.7% a year since 2023, rising debt³, and reliance on central bank financing due to end in 2027⁶. Power without results.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

The state controls its territory and the streets are calm, but order rests increasingly on the courts and the security laws. In April 2025 a court sentenced prominent opposition leaders to between 13 and 66 years for conspiracy against state security, a case activists call baseless and politically motivated¹⁰. Corruption is middling, with a score of 39 and a rank of 91st of 182⁷. Comparable crime data was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence. Calm, but held by pressure rather than consent.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

Tunisian society is relatively homogeneous and has avoided the civil wars of its region. Its politics are hollowing out: turnout was 30.5% for the 2022 constitution⁹ and 28.8% for the 2024 presidential election⁸, and prominent opposition leaders have been jailed¹⁰. Unemployment among graduates and the young is high⁵. Survey data on trust was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence. Peaceful, but disengaged.

Why does the world need this country?

Tunisia is a small economy, about US$62.7 billion in 2026³. Its relevance is mostly symbolic and regional: its 2010 to 2011 revolution set off the Arab Spring¹¹, and its democratic transition won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize¹⁵. Its reversal since 2021⁹ has reduced that symbolic weight. It matters to Europe as a close Mediterranean neighbour, but it has little power of its own.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: finance for a budget deficit Fitch puts at 6.4% of GDP in 2026⁶, with central bank financing due to end in 2027⁶; and jobs for its young and its graduates⁵. Want: to avoid outside conditions on its economic policy, which Saied's government has preferred to central bank and domestic financing⁶; and to keep order at home¹⁰. Fear: a debt crisis as debt nears 86% of GDP³; unrest among unemployed graduates⁵; and criticism of its political trials¹⁰.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Tunisia has narrowed its own options. By financing itself through its central bank and domestic market rather than outside lenders⁶, it has kept policy in its own hands at the price of fragility. Its turn away from democracy since 2021⁹ and the political trials that activists call politically motivated¹⁰ have cooled relations with Western partners. Detailed, sourced data on its relations with Europe, Algeria and the Gulf was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Tunisia's armed forces are small. SIPRI puts military spending at 2.49% of GDP in 2025⁴, on an economy of about US$62.7 billion³. It faces no major external threat. Data on readiness and equipment was not gathered for this assessment, hence low confidence. Its security rests on calm borders and on its partners rather than on force. A small force for a small state.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Tunisia is slowly sliding. The IMF records growth of 0.3% in 2023, 1.7% in 2024 and 2.7% in 2025, with 2.4% forecast for 2026 and 2.0% for 2027³. Government debt is forecast to rise from 81.7% of GDP in 2025 to 89.8% in 2027, and the deficit to widen to 8.6% in 2026³. Fitch has held the rating at B-⁶, but the end of central bank financing in 2027⁶ will test the model. Unemployment among graduates is rising⁵.