Mali

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

The map is hard. Mali is a vast, landlocked Sahelian country⁶, whose imports must travel by road from the ports of its neighbours; in 2025 and 2026 that dependence became a weapon, as jihadists blockaded fuel and goods on the roads to Bamako⁹. It has assets: gold dominates exports, and lithium is becoming a major export commodity⁶. The Niger valley supports rain-fed farming, but rapid population growth, low productivity and climate change threaten food security⁶. Its desert north is vast and hard to govern, and has been fought over since 2012⁸. Mineral wealth in a land that is almost impossible to hold.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

The population is about 25.9 million and among the youngest in the world, with a median age of about 15.9^1,2. Extreme poverty is expected to stay at 34.9% in 2026⁶. About 235,000 young people enter the workforce every year, and job creation is a pressing challenge⁶. The ILO's modelled unemployment rate of 2.8%⁵ says little in an economy where agriculture remains the main source of livelihood for poor rural households⁶. Insecurity weighs on state capacity and service delivery⁶, and recent comparable data on skills is scarce, hence low confidence. A young population the state can neither educate nor protect.

What habits does the society reward?

The institutional habits are weak. Mali scored 28 on Transparency International's 2025 index, up one point, ranking 136th of 182⁷. The army has repeatedly overturned civilian government: in 1968, 1991, 2012 and 2020⁸. Yet Mali also has a deep civic history: a great medieval empire under Sundiata and Mansa Musa⁸, and in 1992 its first democratically elected president⁸. Political life is now closed: in May 2025 the government dissolved all political parties and banned their activities, citing public order⁶. Survey data on trust and work norms is limited, hence low confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, General Assimi Goïta's government has failed at its own stated purpose. It came to power through coups in 2020 and 2021^6,8. In May 2025 it dissolved all political parties, and in July 2025 the transitional parliament granted Goïta a renewable five-year term until the country is pacified⁶. The war has since gone the other way. In April 2026 the defence minister was killed, Goïta was not seen in public during the first days of the offensive, and he has since taken the defence portfolio himself^10,9. It has kept the budget deficit near 2.8% of GDP⁶. A government that took power to win a war and is losing it.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

Order is collapsing. In April 2026 JNIM, linked to al-Qaeda, joined the separatist FLA in coordinated attacks, the heaviest since 2012, seizing cities, towns and military posts from the army and its Russian-backed ally⁹. The defence minister was killed in an attack on his home in Kati¹⁰. JNIM then announced a blockade of Bamako, set up roadblocks and banned everyone from entering the city; in May militants ambushed a fruit convoy on the road to the capital⁹. A fuel blockade had already choked the country in September 2025⁹. The World Bank sees a slight improvement since, but security risks remain high⁶. A state that no longer controls the roads to its own capital.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

Mali is breaking apart along lines its enemies are now joining together. The FLA, a separatist group claiming the territory of Azawad in the north, said it held total control of Kidal in April 2026, a city the army had retaken only in November 2023¹⁰; the World Bank now records its capture by JNIM and the FLA⁶. The separatists and the jihadists of JNIM fought together for the first time^9,10. Political opposition in the south has been silenced since parties were dissolved⁶. The government's base is the army and its Russian allies⁹. A country whose north is lost and whose centre is besieged.

Why does the world need this country?

The world needs Mali's gold and, increasingly, its lithium⁶. The IMF puts its 2026 GDP at about US$34.9bn³. Its strategic weight is negative: its war has reached the roads around the capital, and it is the main test of Russia's security model in Africa, whose Africa Corps fights alongside the army^9,10. It anchors the Alliance of Sahel States, whose joint force and investment bank were launched in Bamako in December 2025⁶. Noticed for what it might export besides gold: instability.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: open roads for fuel and food from coastal ports, which JNIM's blockades have repeatedly cut⁹. Need: revenue from gold and lithium to fund a war that is pushing up security spending⁶. Want, for the junta: survival, with its leader's mandate extended until the country is pacified⁶, and partners such as Russia and its fellow Sahel juntas^9,6. Want: to retake Kidal and the north¹⁰. Fear: a tighter siege of Bamako, a further loss of territory, and El Niño rains damaging harvests^6,9.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Mali has swapped its partners and is weaker for it. French troops, who came to its rescue in 2013, have left^8,10. It left ECOWAS in 2025 with Burkina Faso and Niger, and the three formed the Alliance of Sahel States in 2023, which cut military relations with Western powers and replaced Western troops with Russian forces in 2024¹¹. Russia's Africa Corps now fights alongside the army, but it agreed with the FLA to withdraw from Kidal in April 2026^10,9. The AES launched a 5,000-strong joint force in December 2025⁶. Its patron cannot hold its ground, and its allies face the same insurgency.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Mali spends heavily and fights poorly. SIPRI puts military spending at 3.87% of GDP in 2025⁴, and the World Bank expects security spending to drive the deficit higher in 2026⁶. But in April 2026 its army lost cities, towns and military posts in a single offensive, and its minister of defence was killed near the main base at Kati^9,10. It depends on the Russian-backed Africa Corps⁹. It cannot keep the roads to its capital open⁹. Battlefield data is contested by both sides, hence medium confidence. An army spending more to hold less.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, Mali is falling. The World Bank expects growth of 5.0% in 2026, 2.0% per head, and an average of 5.3% in 2027–2028, driven by mining, lithium and gold prices⁶. Public debt is moderate, projected at 39.5% of GDP⁶. But those numbers sit on top of a state losing a war: the heaviest attacks since 2012, the loss of Kidal, a blockade of the capital and the death of the defence minister, all within a year^9,10. Extreme poverty is stuck at 34.9%⁶. Mines can grow while the state shrinks; the second trend is the one that will decide Mali's future.