South Sudan

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

The map gives South Sudan oil and a trap. Oil was found in Unity State in 1978⁸, and it is the economy's mainstay, but it can only be exported through a pipeline across Sudan: when that pipeline shut in FY25, output fell sharply and the economy contracted⁶. Production recovered to 157,000 barrels a day in early FY26 under a security agreement to protect Sudan's export infrastructure⁶, which now runs through a country at war. Its border with Sudan includes disputed ground: an arbitration in 2009 placed the Heglig oil field in the north, and the Abyei area remains contested⁸. Climate shocks threaten its farming⁶. Oil that the country does not control the route for.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

The population is about 12.4 million, with a median age of about 19^1,2. Their condition is among the worst anywhere. Extreme poverty rose from 84% in 2024 to 87% in 2025⁶. In 2026 more than 10 million people, two-thirds of the population, are projected to need humanitarian assistance, and education and health systems are fragile⁶. In Jonglei, nearly 60% of the population is expected to face crisis-level hunger during the rainy season¹². The ILO's modelled unemployment rate of 12.4%⁵ is dated and says little. A people the state has left to survive on aid.

What habits does the society reward?

The institutional habits are among the weakest in the world. South Sudan scored 9 on Transparency International's 2025 index, ranking 181st of 182⁷. Public money flows outside the budget: significant off-budget spending, financed by banks including the central bank, masks a much larger deficit than reported⁶. Political disputes have repeatedly been settled by force: Kiir sacked his cabinet and vice-president in 2013, and civil war followed within months⁸. Survey data on trust and work norms was not gathered, hence medium confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, President Salva Kiir's government has failed at the basics. The deficit widened to 6.7% of GDP in FY25, driven mainly by spending by the Ministry of Presidential Affairs, while civil servants went 8 to 13 months unpaid⁶. Inflation reached 234%⁶. The World Bank lists frequent rotation of senior officials among the main risks⁶. In March 2025 security forces placed First Vice-President Riek Machar under house arrest; in September he was charged and suspended from office¹³. The 2018 peace agreement has largely collapsed⁹. The government has promised elections in December 2026 after years of delay¹¹. A leadership that has turned the state into a means of keeping power.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

Order has broken down across much of the country. Fighting between government forces and opposition fighters loyal to the SPLA-IO, with allied White Army fighters, spread in Jonglei in early 2026¹². The army ordered civilians and UN staff out of three counties ahead of its offensive¹⁰, and a senior commander urged troops to spare no lives¹². More than 230,000 people had been displaced since December 2025 by February 2026¹². The government insists there is relative peace apart from pockets of insecurity, while observers warn of a return to full-blown conflict⁹. Aid agencies are frequently attacked⁹. A state that cannot protect its people from its own army.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

South Sudan has never been one nation. Its 2013–18 civil war between Kiir's forces and those loyal to Machar was fought along largely ethnic lines and cost about 400,000 lives¹⁰. The 2018 peace deal that ended it has largely collapsed⁹. The fighting of 2026 pits the same camps against each other, with Machar's forces and allied White Army fighters against government troops¹². The case against Machar centres on an attack by a Nuer youth militia on an army base at Nasir in March 2025¹³. A country held together, if at all, by the memory of a common war against the north.

Why does the world need this country?

The world needs South Sudan very little. The IMF puts its 2026 GDP at about US$8bn³. Its oil, about 157,000 barrels a day in early FY26⁶, is small by world standards. It matters mainly as a humanitarian burden and a risk to its region: the war in Sudan, entering its third year, presses on its economy and its people⁶. It hosts a large UN mission, ordered out of parts of Jonglei in 2026¹⁰. Noticed for its crises, not its weight.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: oil flowing through Sudan's pipeline, which depends on a security agreement amid Sudan's war⁶; and money to pay civil servants owed months of salary⁶. Need: food and aid for the two-thirds of the population who require it⁶. Want, for the government: an election on its terms on 22 December 2026, with Machar on trial and under house arrest^11,9; and victory over the SPLA-IO in Jonglei and Upper Nile¹⁰. Fear: a return to full-scale war⁹; disruption of the oil route through Sudan⁶; and the loss of aid as donors pull back⁶.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

South Sudan has no balance of its own; it survives on outside help. Uganda's troops intervened on the government's side when civil war broke out in 2013⁸. Its economy depends on Sudan, through whose territory its oil must pass, and on a security agreement to protect that route⁶. Ethiopia has hosted its peace talks⁸. The World Bank and other donors fund much of its services⁶. The UN has a large mission on its soil, which the army has ordered out of conflict areas¹⁰. Allies enough to survive, not to prosper.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

South Sudan's forces are used mainly against its own people. SIPRI puts military spending at 3.42% of GDP in 2025⁴, a high share of a tiny economy³. The army has not defeated the opposition: SPLA-IO and White Army forces made gains against government troops in Jonglei in early 2026¹². When civil war broke out in 2013, Ugandan troops intervened on its side⁸. The state cannot pay its own civil servants, who were owed 8 to 13 months' salary by January 2026⁶. Data on readiness is poor, hence low confidence. An army that cannot win its own war.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, South Sudan is going backwards. The economy contracted in FY25 when oil output fell after the pipeline shutdown⁶. The IMF expects a rebound of 10.5% in 2026 as oil recovers³, but that restores lost ground rather than building new. Extreme poverty rose to 87% in 2025, inflation reached 234%, and the official exchange rate depreciated by 198%⁶. Fighting resumed in Jonglei, and the peace deal has largely collapsed^12,9. The transitional period runs to February 2027, with elections promised for December 2026^6,11. A country slipping back towards war.