Niger

What does the map enable, and what does it threaten?

The map is hard but not empty. Niger sits at the heart of the Sahel, with a narrow economy that depends heavily on agriculture and on favourable rains⁶. Its exports must reach the sea through neighbours: oil reaches the coast through a pipeline to Benin, commissioned in November 2023^8,11, though the border with Benin remains closed and armed groups sabotage the pipeline in Dosso⁶. Beneath the north lies uranium, mined at Arlit since 1971, but output was only about 1.6% of the world's in 2024¹⁰. Insurgencies press in from Liptako-Gourma in the west and the Lake Chad basin in the south-east⁶. Resources that must cross hostile ground to reach a buyer.

Is the population growing, skilled and staying?

The population is about 28.8 million, with a median age of about 16^1,2. UNFPA, using 2012 data, put fertility at about six children per woman and population growth among the highest in the world²¹. A people this young is an asset only if it is schooled, and here the system fails badly. UNICEF reports that over half of children aged 7 to 16 are not in school, and fewer than 8% of children finishing primary school have sufficient literacy and numeracy²⁰. Poverty is estimated at 47.7% in 2026⁶. The ILO's modelled unemployment rate of 0.4%⁵ says little where most people farm⁶. Much of the data is old, hence low confidence. A demographic surge the state cannot yet educate.

What habits does the society reward?

The institutional habits are weak. Niger scored 31 on Transparency International's 2025 index, down three points, ranking 124th of 182⁷. The army overthrew governments in 1974 and 2010⁹, and again in 2023¹²; soldiers mutinied in 2002 and again in August 2026^9,14. Yet there is a civic record too: a constitutional conference stripped a military ruler of his powers in 1991, and in 2021 Niger saw its first democratic transfer of power since independence⁹. In March 2025 the junta dissolved all political parties¹⁶. Survey data on trust and work norms is scarce, hence low confidence. This score is about institutions and social habits, not about any group.

Who rules, how are they chosen, and are they competent?

Judged by deeds, General Abdourahamane Tiani's government has a fair economic record and a poor security one. It took power in a July 2023 coup, and in March 2025 gave Tiani a five-year 'flexible' term that can be extended depending on the security situation^12,16. It has cleared arrears and reprofiled debt, and growth is estimated at 7.0% in 2026⁶. In 2026 it mended ties with Algeria and Benin⁶. But jihadists attacked the base at Niamey's airport in January and June, and in August disgruntled soldiers rose against the government, put down with help from Russian mercenaries^12,13,14. Tiani blamed France, Benin and Ivory Coast for the January attack without offering evidence¹². A government that cannot fully rely on its own army.

Is there rule of law, low corruption and predictability?

Order is eroding. ACLED recorded 1,939 conflict deaths in Niger in 2025, more than 1,200 of them in Tillabéri¹⁵. Most civilians killed died in attacks by the Islamic State Sahel Province, followed by operations of the army and of JNIM¹⁵. More than 1 million people were forcibly displaced as of August 2026⁶. Armed groups in Dosso sabotage the oil pipeline and carry out kidnappings and extortion⁶. The capital is no longer safe: the military base at Niamey's airport was attacked in January 2026 and again in June, when at least 11 soldiers and two civilians were killed^12,13. In August soldiers mutinied and attacked sensitive sites in Niamey¹⁴. The violence has not yet reached Mali's scale of lost towns, which keeps this a 2 and not a 1.

Where are the fault lines, and how stable are they?

The fault lines are many and widening. The north saw a Tuareg rebellion from 1990 and another until a 2009 agreement to end hostilities⁹. Today the violence is in the west and south-east, in Tillabéri and the Lake Chad basin⁶, and the army itself ranks second, after the Islamic State group, among the killers of civilians recorded by ACLED¹⁵. Both Nigerien forces and their Russian partners have been accused of killing civilians¹⁵. Politics is closed: the parties were dissolved in March 2025, and the elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, remains detained^16,14. The August 2026 mutiny showed division inside the army itself¹⁴. Survey data is thin, hence low confidence. A country held together by an army that is itself divided.

Why does the world need this country?

The world needs Niger less than it once did. The IMF puts its 2026 GDP at about US$23.4bn³. Uranium once made it an important supplier, but output fell to about 1.6% of the world's in 2024, and the main mine was nationalised in June 2025 after a dispute with France's Orano¹⁰. Oil exports since 2024 give it a new earner¹¹. Its strategic weight lies more in what it hosts: Air Base 101 in Niamey houses the headquarters of Russia's Africa Corps and of the Alliance of Sahel States' unified force²². Once a base for Western counter-terrorism, it forced out French and US forces after the coup¹⁷. Relevant mainly as a front line of the Sahel's war.

What does it need, want and fear?

Need: oil revenue flowing through the Benin pipeline, which armed groups sabotage in Dosso^6,11; good rains for the farms most people live on⁶; and an army that stays loyal¹⁴. Want, for the junta: survival through a five-year transition that can be extended¹⁶; buyers and partners for its nationalised uranium, including Russia's Rosatom, whose Uranium One signed a cooperation memorandum with Niger's state uranium company in December 2025¹⁰; and investment such as the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline with Algeria⁶. Fear: further attacks on Niamey, another mutiny, and hostile neighbours: it has accused France, Benin and Ivory Coast of sponsoring an attack on Niamey, and Chad of a deadly drone strike, which Chad denies^12,19.

Who are its patrons, rivals and hedges?

Niger has swapped its partners. After the 2023 coup it forced out French and US forces; the last Americans left the Agadez base in August 2024¹⁷. It left ECOWAS with Mali and Burkina Faso in January 2025¹⁸. Russia is now its security partner: Tiani thanked Russian troops for helping repel the January 2026 airport attack, and Russian mercenaries helped put down the August mutiny^12,14. It has more room than its allies: in 2026 it signed over twenty agreements with Algeria and agreed a roadmap with Benin towards reopening the border⁶. But new quarrels are growing: in October 2026 it accused Chad of a drone strike that killed two civilians; Chad denies it and accuses Niger of harbouring Chadian rebels¹⁹. More options than Mali, but no patron strong enough to secure it.

Can it deter, or does it depend on others?

Niger spends a modest share on a war it is not winning. SIPRI puts military spending at 2.14% of GDP in 2025⁴, on an economy of about US$23bn³. The World Bank expects security spending to help widen the deficit to 3.4% of GDP in 2026⁶. The results are poor: the base at Niamey's airport was attacked twice in six months^12,13, and Russian help was needed to put down a mutiny in the capital¹⁴. Tiani has since replaced the armed forces chief, and a tour of units was aimed at restoring cohesion among the troops¹⁴. The army faces insurgents in Tillabéri, Dosso and the Lake Chad basin at once⁶. Battlefield data is contested, hence medium confidence. An army stretched thin and unsure of its own ranks.

Rising, stagnant or declining, and how fast?

Judged by results, the economy is rising while the state weakens. Oil exports lifted growth to 8.4% in 2024¹¹, and the World Bank estimates 7.0% in 2026, or 3.1% per head, and an average of 6.4% in 2027–28⁶. Poverty is estimated to have fallen to 47.7%⁶. But the boom came with rapid debt accumulation, and in 2025 the IMF and World Bank raised Niger's debt risk to high¹¹; arrears clearance has since moderated it⁶. Moody's rates it Caa3 after arrears on debt service⁸. Meanwhile conflict deaths, attacks on the capital and a mutiny point the other way^15,13,14. Growth from oil and rain-fed farming, both vulnerable to shocks¹¹, cannot outrun a failing security state for long.